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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERONA WALLACE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
COTTONWOOD MALL SHOPPING 
CENTER, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 240653 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action in which Plaintiff seeks damages for injuries 
to her, suffered when she fell on a slippery substance left on the 
floor of Defendant's shopping center. 
Plaintiff, while walking across the terrazzo floor of Defend-
ant's Cottonwood Mall, slipped on a substance which was later identi-
fied as an Orange Julius drink, spilled on the floor presumably by 
another patron, but left on the floor for an indefinite period of 
time. (Tr. 2-4) 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury, after receiving forty-three (43) Instructions, 
and deliberating, returned a special verdict as follows: 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
"We, the jury in the above-entitled action, for our special 
verdict concerning part of the issues in this case, answer the 
questions submitted as follows: 
1. was the substance on the floor for such a length of 
time that the Defendant Cottonwood Mall in exercising reasonable 
care should have known of its presence arrl thereafter had a reason-
able opportunity to remedy the condition and did not do so. 
ANSWER: YES 
2. If your answer to Question No. 1 is "yes" then was such 
conduct of defendant, Cottonwood Mall, a proximate cause of 
Plaintiff's injuries? 
ANSWER: YES 
3. At the time and place in question and under the conditions 
as shown by the evidence, was the Plaintiff, Verona Wallace, negli-
gent? 
ANSWER: YES 
4. If your answer to Question No. 3 is "yes", was such negli-
gence of the plaintiff a proximate cause of her own injuries? 
ANSWER: YES. 
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5. Considering all negligence that caused the accident at 
One Hundred Percent (100%), what percentage of that negligence is 
attributable to: 
(a) Defendant, Cottonwood Mall 
---'l'-0 __ %. 
(b) Plaintiff, Verona Wallace _ _.;;1;...0 __ %. 
( c) Others __ 8_0 __ %. 
(d) Total --"1'-0_0 __ % 
6. Set forth the amount of damages that you find Plaintiff, 
Verona Wallace, has suffered as a result of the injuries received 
in the accident in question: 
Medical Expenses 
(Medications, X-ray, Doctor 
bills, and etc.) 
Other Special Damages 
(Expenses for Housekeeping 
bills, and Etc.) 
General Damages 
(Mental & Physical Pain and 
Suffering, and etc.} 
TOTAL 
Dissenting Jurors: 
7 
2 
$ 300.00 
$ 1760.00 
$ __ o __ 
$ 2,060.00 
No. of Questions To Which Juror 
Dissented 
1 
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DATED this 3/23 day of March, 1978. 
ROSE N. KRAMER 
Foreman or Forelady 
(Tr. 117-118) o 
Later the Court entered Judgment on the Special verdict in 
favor of the Defendant and against Plaintiff "No Cause of Action" 
and awarded costs to Defendant. (Tr. 12 5-12 7) • 
It is from this Special Verdict and the Judgment on the Ver-
diet and the Instructions which Plaintiff-Appellant alleges were 
confusing to the jury, that she appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
INSTRUCTION NO. 30 IS VERY CONFUSING AND CANNOT BE SQUARED 
WITH ANY OF THE PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS. 
The words and construction "In answering the parts of the 
damage question, be careful not to include or duplicate in any 
parts amounts included in any other part answered by you." That 
part of the Instruction Appellant submits is so unintelligible as 
to thoroughly confuse the jury. 
This confusion is born out by the unintelligible answers 
found in the Special Verdict. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-5-
POINT II 
THE SPECIAL VERDICT AND ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 1 FOUND 
DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURIES. 
You are instructed that the Cottonwood Mall is subject to 
liability for the harm caused to the plaintiff by a condition on 
the floor at the Cottonwood Mall if, but only if, you find from a 
preponderance of the evidence that: 
1. The presence of the substance constituted a dangerous and 
unsafe condition, and 
2. That the defendant, Cottonwood Ma-11, by or through its 
agents had actual notice of the presence of the substance prior 
to the accident, and thereafter had a reasonable opportunity to 
remedy the condition and did not do so, or that if the Defendant 
did not know of the presence of the substance causing plaintiff 
to fall that it had been on the floor so long that the defendant 
in exercising reasonable care should have known of its presence 
and thereafter had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition 
and did not do so." 
The jury in answer to No. 1 found in substance that Defendant 
was in fact negligent and that the negligence was the proximate 
cause of the injury. In other words by the jury's answer to No. 1 
it found Defendant did have an opportunity by exercising reasonable 
care to discover the slippery substance in time to avoid the acci-
dent. 
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Again, in answer to Question No. 2, the jury again found 
the conduct of Defendant the proximate cause of the injury. 
POINT III 
THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE SO INCONSISTENT THAT THE JURY WAS 
CONFUSED. 
Instruction No. 9 tells the jury Plaintiff was an invitee 
with a duty on the part of Defendant to keep the premises in a 
safe condition for Plaintiff to enter and take care of the business 
that brought her to Cottonwood Mall. 
Again, in Instruction No. 10, the jury was instructed in sub-
stance that the duty to make the premises safe for Plaintiff ex-
tended to all portions of the premises. 
Instruction No. 11 again tells the jury that if the substance 
remained on the floor long enough for Defendant to have discovered 
it, the jury must find in favor of Plaintiff and assess damages 
accordingly. This is exactly what the jury did by answers to both 
No. 1 and No. 6 of the Special Verdict wherein it found in No. 1 
that the substance was on the floor for a reasonable time to give 
Defendant an opportunity to remedy the peril. 
In its answer to No. 6 of the Special Verdict it assessed 
the damages accordingly. The jury also in response to Instruction 
No. 11 assessed the damages accordingly. 
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Again, in Instruction No. 12 the jury is told again in sub-
stance of the duty of Defendant to keep the premises safe for its 
patrons. 
However, starting with Instruction No. 16 the jury is sudden-
ly instructed in another direction. The 16th Instruction appears 
to the Appellant to be further confusing to the jurors. 
Coming to Instruction No. 20, the Court instructed the jury, 
we submit, in direct conflict to the earlier instructions - "In 
the exercise of its duty the Cottonwood Mal; must use reasonable 
and ordinary care, but under the law it is not an insurer of, nor 
does it guarantee the safety of users of the premises." 
Instruction No. 21 is in direct conflict with the earlier 
instruction regarding its duty to make the premises safe. 
Again, the jury answered Instruction No. 22 that the slippery 
substance remained on the floor long enough to give Defendant, in 
the exercise of reasonable care, an opportunity to remedy the con-
dition before the injury. However, the emphasis this time tends 
to excuse Defendant, with the further resultant confusion to the 
jury. 
Instruction No. 24 regarding "Defendant having the right to 
assume that _users of the Mall have normal eyesight and that they 
use the same in exercising ordinary care for their own safety 
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unless, in the exercise of due care, Defendant observes or should 
observe something to warn him to the contrary." 
We respectfully submit this Instruction is meaningless and 
again confusing to a jury. 
We further submit that Instruction No. 25 is in direct con-
flict with the earlier instructions in which the Court in In-
structions No. 9, 10, and 11 tells the jury Plaintiff is an In-
vitee and that the Defendant has a duty to make the premises safe 
for her in the transaction of her business at Cottonwood Mall. 
However, at Instruction No. 25 the Court places Plaintiff in the 
category of a licensee and that she is required "to observe" and 
be aware of the existing conditions then and there present, and 
to keep a lookout for obstacles or other conditions reasonably 
to be anticipated." Again, the jury was, we submit, left with a 
confused definition of what the duties of each Plaintiff and De-
fendant were and wherein the liability lay. Under the Instructions 
the Court left the jury in a conflicting position as to whether 
Plaintiff was an invitee or licensee which we submit utterly con-
fused them. 
POINT IV 
THE ANSWERS IN THE SPECIAL VERDICT ARE SO INCONSISTENT AS TO 
WARRANT A NEW TRIAL. 
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We have pointed out the various inconsistencies in the In-
structions to the jury. The verdict bears out the fact that not 
only were the Instructions misleading and confusing, but also that 
the answers in the Special Verdict bear out the confusion. It is 
apparent that the jury intended to award damages to Plaintiff and 
the jurors even set out the amount (Answer No. 6). 
POINT V. 
THE COURT HAD A DUTY TO CLARIFY THE APPARENT CONFUSION OF 
THE JURY WHEN THE VERDICT WAS RETURNED. 
We respectfully submit that the Judge presiding at the trial 
had a duty to reinstruct the jury, or set aside the verdict when 
it was returned with such an apparent confused Answers and Findings. 
53 Am. Jur 440 #554: "If a case should go to the jury at all, 
it should go under proper instructions correctly declaring the 
legal principles involved. Instructions which are erroneous and 
misleading constitute grounds for a new trial or reversal of the 
judgment, unless the error is harmless." 
Again, at 53 Am. Jur. 442 #557: "Instructions as a whole must 
be consistent and harmonious, not conflicting and contradictory. 
Where instructions givaito the jury for their guidance, contradictory 
and conflicting rules which are unexplained and where following one 
might lead to a different result than would obtain by following the 
other, the instructions are inherently defective ••••. Inconsistent 
instructions are calculated to mislead and confuse the jury, since Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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the jury are thereby left in doubt and without any certain guide 
as to the law arising upon the evidence. 
88 C.J.S.: Inconsistent and Contradictory Instructions: 
"Instructions must not be conflicting, inconsistent or con-
tradictory. It is, therefore, proper to refuse, and error to give, 
conflicting and contradictory instructions, and this is particular-
ly true where the conflicting and contradictory instructions are 
on a material point or issue, since a charge containing two dis-
tinct propositions conflicting with each other tends so to confuse 
the jury as to prevent their rendition of an intelligent verdict. 
"The jury cannot be required to determine what part of a con-
tradictory charge is correct, and it is not for the jury to select 
from contradictory instructions those that correctly express the 
law, and they should not be left to reconcile conflicting points 
of law. Where inconsistent and contradictory instructions are 
given, it ordinarily cannot be determined from the verdict which 
rule was adopted by the jury, and the court is thus left in doubt 
and uncertainty as to the facts actually found by the jury as a 
basis for its verdict, and where instructions are inconsistent 
with, or conflict each other, it is usually impossible to say 
whether the jury were controlled by the one or the other. 
"It may, consequently, be ground for reversal where contra-
dictory and conflicting instructions have been given, although 
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it has been said that the mere fact that an instruction conflicts 
with another instruction is in itself no reason for condemning it, 
and correct instructions do not become erroneous merely because 
they are in conflict with incorrect instructions given for the op-
posite party. An inconsistent instruction cannot be sustained on 
the theory that a defendant was entitled to a peremptory instruction. 
Judgment will not be reversed where the inconsistency is only ap-
parent, and not actual, or if it is apparent from reading the 
charge as a whole that the jury could not have been misled, and 
charges should not be examined with a legal microscope for techni-
cal flaws and contradictory statements. In determining whether 
there is a conflict, the decisive question is whether the instruc-
tions read as a whole and in light of the circumstances of the re-
quest in which they are given, are apt to confuse a person of or-
dinary intelligence. 
Simpson vs. General Motors Corp. 24 Utah 2nd 301, 470 P 2nd 
399: "Specific jury instructions should be considered in its en-
tirety along with all other instructions." (No such instruction 
was given in the instant case) • 
See DeMille vs. Erickson, 23 Ut 2nd 278, 462 P2nd 159. 
In Barton vs. Jensen, 19 Ut 2nd 196 (429 P2nd 44) Tuckett, J.: 
"A majority of the members of the Court are of the opinion that in 
cases such as this, which consist of simple negligence, where only 
two parties are involved, it would be better practice to submit 
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the case to the jury upon a general verdict. It appears that 
the best efforts of trial judge to make interrogatories simple, 
concise, and understandable still result in juries misunderstand-
ing what is intended." 
Badger vs. Clayson 18 Ut 2nd 329, 422 P 2nd 665. 
Brm.sonvs. Strong, 17 Ut2nd 364, 412 P2nd 451. 
Wellman vs. Noble, 366 P2nd 701, 12 Ut 2nd 350. 
Ivie v.s Richardson, 9 Ut2nd 5, 336 P2nd 781. 
Joseph vs. W. H. Groves LDS Hospital, 318 P2nd 330, 7 Ut2nd 39. 
SUMMARY 
In conclusion we respectfully submit the inconsistencies 
of the Instructions, and particularly the conflicting instructions 
as to whether Plaintiff was a licensee or an invitee were incor-
rect and resulted in the confused and hardly intelligible verdict. 
Plaintiff is entitled to a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
e;;< l-:,~~ark ~;v&;~;t;& 
. l~--~A'l-"tC~A_ 
for Plaintiff 
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